星期三, 5月 11, 2005

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恭喜自己!上月文章已於今天被信報刊登,稿費將作為母親節禮物,請母親大人飲茶。現將文章再次上載。有空要慶祝一下才行!


國際評論P21
Hong Kong Economic Journal
梁懿雯2005-05-11

德日對侵略罪行認識的差別及原因
  一般中國分析家評論德日兩國差別時都強調兩者對戰爭以及其罪行認識的差別。前者尊重歷史,誠心向各受害國道歉及賠償,後者則相反。在分析兩國時,其實大部分人都忽略了兩國之間的兩個根本的不同之處。
  其一,德國人在二戰中本身亦是受害者,許多人都成為了優生學(Eugenics)的祭品。
納粹暴行禍及國民
  在二戰前,德國奉行的納粹種族主義,不但視猶太人為低等民族,還把德國國內有缺陷的人一一清洗,甚至強行幫醫學界認為基因有問題的人做絕育手術(Sterilization),所持的理由是基因缺陷影響下一代德國人的優越性。只有擁有優良基因的德國人才有生育的權利(甚至是義務)。由於當時醫學相對落後,研究基因的方法十分不科學,甚至是原始,許多長相有異的人都被誤判為有基因缺陷,以致成為強迫絕育的受害者。有的受害者自小絕育而不自知,直到結婚後一直不能生育才驚覺。華盛頓的二戰大屠殺博物館內就保存了相當多這樣的記錄,以及對受害者的訪問。根據大屠殺博物館的文獻記載,自一九三三年七月十四日德國為優化國民立法開始,至一九三九年優化國民計劃結束,約有四十萬德國人被迫接受絕育手術。而德國有許多「基因有缺陷」的國民亦像猶太人一樣,被送進集中營,甚至是毒氣室。
  相對來說,日本人民所受的戰爭禍害就少得多。雖然許多日本家庭因有人參軍戰死而痛失親人,亦有許多家庭因美國投下的兩枚原子彈而家破人亡,但比起德國,日本人因戰爭而受害的畢竟是少數。況且,這兩類受害人並不會因此而加深對戰爭的認識,又或對政府引起戰禍有任何深刻的檢討。為天皇戰死,對許多日本人來說是一種光榮,況且戰死的日本人並不比德國人多。根據大英百科全書記錄,德國共約三百五十萬士兵戰死,而平民死亡人數為七十八萬;日本則約一百三十萬士兵戰死,另有六十七萬平民死於二戰,當中約二十萬死於美國的原子彈下。而許多日本人對於由原子彈引起對戰爭的厭惡,充其量只是對美國的反感及對戰敗的屈辱。許多右翼分子至今亦不認為日本戰敗了。而這種反感與屈辱感就成為了爭當「正常國家」的動力。
  於是,兩國在戰爭中的不同政策導致了兩國人民受害程度的不同,及對戰禍理解的不同,這就成為民族性及美國介入以外的另一個解釋。
  其二,各國對接受賠款的態度差異,間接導致了德日兩國對戰爭的不同認識。德國對受害國賠償加道歉,得到歐洲各國的接受及尊重。根據大屠殺博物館資料記載,僅是對以色列及歐洲各國猶太人的賠償至今就高達五百五十億美元,著名經濟學家凱因斯亦有著作專門討論德國的巨額賠款對歐洲經濟的影響。
日本從未正式賠償
  由於中國並沒有接受日本任何賠償(蔣介石所謂的以德報怨),不但令日本減低罪惡感,更在某程度上令右翼分子理直氣壯。不少日本人都認為對華的援助貸款已相當於足夠的賠償。
  有人指出,日本對中國應作出的賠償就算不足以導致其分裂,亦可以大大拖延其戰後重建,阻止日本的高速發展。這個論點未必成立,因為日本人的創意在發展中也起了主要作用。但免去賠償卻確實令日本減輕了財政上及道德上的負擔。除卻這道德上的負擔,日本有何重新認識、評價歷史的壓力呢?沒付出沉重的代價應是日本政府拒絕深刻檢討的一個重要原因。
  綜上所述,日本無論是國民還是政府在二戰中所付出的代價都不算沉重,而各國對其罪行的追究又能帶來足夠的壓力。這些都造就了德日兩國的差別。
  要令日本正視戰爭罪行,亞洲各國就可以做的就只有兩點。首先是全面比較德日兩國的行為差異,以德國的正面例子不斷教育日本。其次,現在只有中國和南韓兩國民眾的反日行為被西方傳媒注意,但往往是不懷好意的報道。所以,所有被日本侵略過的受害國,無論是政府或是民間組織,都應聯合起來向日本施壓,讓國際社會明白對日本的不滿並非只限於中韓兩國的激進分子,亦不予西方傳媒對中韓兩國妖魔化的機會。
    作者為美國喬治華盛頓大學政治系博士研究生

1 則留言:

匿名 說...

The post-war relation between China and Japan has been complicated and often emotional. Of the many on-going issues after 60 years since the end of WWII, perhaps the most debated one is China’s demand for adequate apology (its definition is still open to discussion) and compensation. It appears that Chinese people (and their government, whenever convenient) repeatedly claim that Japan has failed to express remorse to its wartime wrongdoing and that the Japanese should do a lot more, including refrain from attempting to gain a permanent seat at the UN security council, to shows its regrets.

Whether Japan has done enough and apologized enough (18 times since the restoration of diplomatic relation between the two countries in 1972) is an ongoing debate, so is the question whether Japan as a whole has adequately faced, or is willing to face, its wartime record.

An important point that is often overlooked is that official politics and the opinion/behaviour of the government are merely two of the many indicators of public beliefs. Although it is true that, compare to Germany, Japan as a nation has seem to done a lot less to compensate the loss of its neighbouring countries, it is still yet to determine whether the awareness, and sense of responsibility and guilt of Japanese citizens are really lacking.

The alternative explanations of the discrepancy between the two WWII defeating countries provided in your article--Japan’s relatively little impairment due to the war and the lack of compensation leading to a public lack of awareness--are logical and perhaps even accurate. However, there are a few points that require further investigation before drawing to the conclusions you provided.

First of all, although it is true that there remain groups of Japanese (e.g., right-wing nationalists) who deny their country’s villainous behaviour during the war, they remain arguably a minority. It is problematic to draw comparisons between Japan’s right-wing nationalists and Germany as a whole and to say that the nationalists of the former pertain to the opinion of the entire nation. In fact, the right-wing nationalists of Germany (e.g., the Neo-Nazis) might also similarly deny many historic facts as fictitious. Whether or not Japanese people’s awareness and recognition of their country’s responsibility during WWII is comparable to their German counterpart, is an empirical question. I suspect, like always, one would find mixed responses, mixed feelings and mixed degree of knowledge in both Japan and Germany. Thus, until sufficient evidence is available, let’s not conclude that Japanese people do not regret and do not feel responsible for their ancestors’ crime.

Second, it may be inaccurate to claim that Japan has not provided any “compensation” for its war crime. Japan remains the single-biggest provider of low-interest loans to China, and it had also been a major provider of grants, which do not have to be paid back by the Chinese government, over the years. Although continue to drop and will likely disappear in the near future, economic aid to China stood at 108.02 bn yen ($1.05 bn) in 2003 alone. Although one might be right to say that such grants and loans provide by Japanese tax-payer via their ODA is a act of "checkbook diplomacy," it is still virtually free money given to China (and arguably Chinese officials) and must not be ignored or explained away--after all, little aid is altruistic in nature. In fact, I suspect that many Japanese see such financial aids as a form of apology. Similarly, there are at least 18 accounts of spoken and written apologies by high-rank Japanese officials (including the former emperor and various PMs) since 1972. However, it always take two sides for an apology--whether China accepts them as apologies or not and whether Chinese people are aware of and accept them, is another story. In fact, it would be fascinating to investigate perceived apologies and their effectiveness. The ongoing conflict between the Israeli and Palestinians may even serve as a rather unpromising, mirroring case. Perhaps apologizing on behave of your ancestor (or someone else, in general) is after all ineffective and useless in the long-run.

Third, it should be noted that the text book that caused the recent dispute is actually used by less than one percent of schools in Japan. Perhaps the facts that 99+% of schools refuse to use “right-wing” text books, that a significant number of teachers refused to stand for the rise of the national flag and anthem in school, and that a substantial minority continues to disagree the legalization of their flag and anthem tell us that at least a good portion of Japanese people are not unaware of nor unwilling to face history.

Fourth, it is hard to determine that the Japanese (and particularly Japanese civilian) are, as you suggested, less of a victim of WWII than their German counterparts. Indeed if we compare the absolute number of casualty, Japan might seem less “damaged.” However, if we consider other long-term loss, the picture might be quite different. Harvard historian John Dower has given excellent accounts of Japan’s (especially ordinary people) consequences of its defeat in his writings. He reminds us that the impact goes way beyond Americans’ occupation, and life and monetary loss. The terms and treaty of Germany’s defeat, as one example, was decided collectively by the victorious countries. Japan’s, on the other hand, was designed and decided by the United States alone. Dower also depicted quite vividly the discontents of Japanese civilians to their militant government after the war. It appears that a sense of betrayed was definitely in the air in Japan.

In addition, we might want to go further to reconsider how “loss” should be measured? Do we count only the number of victims? Do we calculate only the physical and monetary loss? What about the social consequences and other less obvious but equally pervasive and long-lasting damages? The impact of the two nuclear bombs dropped in western Japan are still under investigation, the psychological effect of having two foreign military bases in one’s country is still overlooked. Perhaps we should review the various forms of loss of the two major defeaters of WWII, and especially their civilians, before making a direct comparison and satisfying with simple answers. Of course, let me state it clear that their loss is incomparable to the much greater loss they inflicted on others.
With the above said, however, there are at least a few things Japan could learn from post-war Germany.

One thing that the Japanese government may consider doing, if they wish to improve their relations with neighbouring countries would be to set up an agreement in how to teach history to its students. France and Germany has a similar agreement that their text books are written (somewhat) collectively. (Perhaps Chinese students would also benefit from a collectively written text book, provide that little is taught about China’s maneuvers in Vietnam and Tibet). If we wish to educate future generations relatively accurately (as often an “absolute” history is impossible), perhaps a multilateral committee should be set up to guide and monitor how history is taught. Even more ideally, the people of each society should themselves be capable in and educated enough to do such monitoring and to ensure that history is passed on fairly and responsibly.

Another room for improvement is perhaps in Japan’s attitude towards extreme right-wingers. In Germany, flashing anything with a Hakenkreuz (the Nazi symbol) would very likely lead you to a sentence in jail. Yet in Japan, there is yet (don’t quote me on this) a law against public showing of the rising-sun flag used during the war or other war mnemonics. Likewise, there are many other things that are tolerated in Japan that might actually be taboos or offensive, both legally and socially speaking, in other countries. But then again, issues like this one is often complicated by other issues such as culture, freedom and the like.

Going back to the main point, as stated above, we ought to be cautious when using international politics as an indicator of national opinion/sentiment. As we know, our political leaders would willingly compromise their country’s relations with other nations, if it would win them a few extra votes. And in the parliament system like the one in Japan, the votes that really count are often not those of the general public but those from the members of the leading party. It is still hard to determine whether Japan as a whole (not its political leaders nor right-wing nationalists/activists) has faced, or is willing to face, their nation’s wartime record squarely. We should remind ourselves that there isn’t a equal sign between the Japanese government and the people of Japan; nor is there one between the Chinese government and the people of China.

This is my two-cents and congratulations on your publication!